Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts

16 January 2013

The Prison on Lonts’kyi Street: Memory Dialogue or Memory Monologue?

Courtyard of the museum, photo by Uilleam Blacker

The Prison on Lonts’kyi Street: Memory Dialogue or Memory Monologue?


Uilleam Blacker

First published on the Current Ukrainian Politics Blog:
http://ukraineanalysis.wordpress.com/2013/01/04/the-prison-on-lontskyi-street-memory-dialogue-or-memory-monologue/

L’viv’s wartime history is complex, and demands sensitivity and an understanding that victimhood and guilt are not always exclusive categories. The history of the site of the prison on Lonts’kyi Street speaks to this complexity. It speaks of the Polish state that forcefully oppressed Ukrainian political and cultural aspirations, and also of the Poles tortured, killed and deported by the Soviets. It reminds of Ukrainian victims of the Soviets, but also of Ukrainians’ part in the L’viv pogrom of 1941; it speaks of the Jewish victims of that pogrom, and of wider anti-Semitic violence and murder. This site speaks to the history of interwar Lwów, where Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews failed to build a strong enough society to withstand the chaos that the war would bring. For these reasons, it is a good thing that there is a museum at Lonts’kyi. Its history of the tragic intertwining of the fates of various groups makes it a perfect location to examine that history and learn from it. Unfortunately, the current museum does not take advantage of this opportunity.

03 October 2012

Memory and Language in Ukraine: some reflections on a recent journey


It is hard to underestimate the usefulness of physically visiting landscapes of memory. This simple act can be just as instructive as hours spent in libraries or trawling the internet. As well as affording the opportunity to learn things that one would otherwise miss, it allows one to connect to the memories that one studies practically, rather than simply theoretically. It can also challenge many of the assumptions we make as we approach our subject, and many of the conclusions we draw as we study from afar.

Symbols of Soviet and Greek-Catholic memory co-exist in L'viv (photo: U. Blacker)
One assumption that falls apart as one walks through Ukraine’s memoryscapes is that of the ‘two Ukraines’. That is, two different territories, two different cultures, two different memories, and of course, two different languages. Observing Ukraine from a distance, through the media, it is easy to concur. East versus West, Russian versus Ukrainian, Stalin versus Bandera, etc. Ukraine’s ‘split personality’ has been sharply underlined by the recent political conflict over the language bill. Russian tries to squeeze out Ukrainian, and Ukrainian tries valiantly to resist linguistic colonization. The two languages fight each other, like deputies in the parliament, like partisans against insurgents.
Yet language is not war. One does not have to choose a side to fight for. In this case, it is quite possible to inhabit two camps at once. Languages are not ideologies, and can be combined, can co-exist. This is the case in Ukraine, as is evident to anyone who visits the country. And just as language is not unitary, neither is that other important constituent of identity, memory. Both language and memory diverge, re-converge, overlap, quarrel and even engage in dialogue. The one thing they do not do is separate out cleanly, simply and irrevocably.

27 September 2012

Understanding Katyn

Epitaph tablets honouring Katyn victims outside of Kharkiv, Ukraine


Earlier this month the National Archives of the United States released to the public a massive corpus of declassified documents related to Katyn, the massacre of nearly 22,000 unarmed Polish prisoners by Stalin's secret police in 1940. Obscured by one of the longest and most extensive cover-ups in history, Katyn has been for decades a sodden field of unanswered questions, among them: did the Allies know during the Second World War that the Soviet Union, not Nazi Germany, was responsible for the crime? 

Many of the documents made public on 10 September 2012 shed light on this question. They offer evidence that the Roosevelt Administration likely knew of Stalin's guilt as early as 1943, when the Katyn site was first discovered, and subsequently suppressed that knowledge in order to preserve a fragile wartime alliance with the Kremlin. One of the biggest revelations is a secret communiqué of September 1950 sent by US Army Intelligence to Major Donald B. Stewart, who was one of two American POWs to dispatch coded messages positing Soviet responsibility for the massacre in 1943. "Ref[erring to] Katyn massacre you are directed not to repeat, not to affirm, deny or discuss in any manner the coded report you made," the order reads. "Info pertaining to existence of such reports is highly classified."

The news about these archival disclosures has largely focussed our attention on the Katyn forest in western Russia that gives the tragedy its name. One article even implies that all of the 22,000 executed Polish prisoners are buried there. In reality, however, the majority of these victims perished far from the Katyn forest. They were shot outside of Kalinin (today's Tver) in northwestern Russia, near Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine, and in secret prisons in cities such as Minsk, the Belarusian capital. Today the remains of these victims - the pride and promise of the Polish people - are buried in mass graves throughout Russia, Ukraine and, most likely, Belarus. They lie alongside Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian artists and civic figures; Jews, Catholics and Orthodox; men and women known and unknown. All of them were murdered by the Stalinist regime.

Katyn, in other words, is not simply Katyn. It is Mednoe near Tver and Piatykhatky near Kharkiv, where Polish families and the Polish state have spearheaded the construction of memorials to all of Stalin's victims. It is Bykivnia, the forest on the outskirts of Kyiv where, as we now know, the Soviet secret police buried Polish Katyn victims next to unknown thousands of Ukrainian and other Soviet citizens executed during the Purges. It is likely also Kurapaty, the forest near Minsk containing the remains of tens of thousands of murdered Belarusian and other Soviet citizens that has long been suspected of concealing the remains of the Katyn dead. Today these sites are places of pilgrimage for Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian families alike.

The legacy of Katyn across Eastern Europe is not only material and human. It is also deeply symbolic. Katyn has become a central referential touchstone and descriptive shorthand for other, lesser-known atrocities in the region. There is the "Ukrainian Katyn" of Vinnytsia, the city in central Ukraine where in 1937-8 Stalin's secret police tortured and executed over 9,000 Ukrainians and other Soviet citizens and built a "Gorky Park of Culture and Rest" over their bodies to cover up the crime. There are also the "Lithuanian Katyns" of Kaušėnų and Ablinga, where the Nazis killed a total of nearly 2,000 Jews and other civilians during the Second World War.

As we come to know more about Katyn in the future, as new documents emerge and new theories develop, we would do well to endeavour to understand it in full. Katyn is a Polish national tragedy, but it is also a collective Eastern European tragedy, one that has literally and figuratively touched the entire region. Already observers are bracing for political fallout from this week's discoveries, which may "reignite the intense debate over historical memory and wartime allegiances in Eastern Europe". Yet to understand Katyn is to reject "intense debates" that force easy sides, sow discord, and politicise the past for present gain. Over seventy years on, its lessons remain dialogue, empathy, and solidarity.

Rory Finnin
University of Cambridge

Originally published in the Huffington Post on 12 September 2012

07 July 2011

Post-Soviet Monuments to Holocaust Victims, by Andriy Portnov

On Three Monuments to Holocaust Victims:
Reflections on Victory Day (9 May)


Andriy Portnov

There was no place for ethnically or religiously marked suffering or victims in the Soviet image of the Great Patriotic War. It is precisely for this reason that the phrase ‘peaceful Soviet citizens’ was used in referring to the millions of Jews who were murdered. The Soviet deportations on ethnic grounds and on accusation of collective ‘betrayal of the Motherland’ were an absolute taboo. Also unmentionable was the fate of Soviet POWs, millions of whom died of artificial famine in Nazi concentration camps, while hundreds of thousands more survived only to find themselves later sent to Soviet camps as ‘traitors to the Motherland’.

05 April 2011

Sites of Forgetting II, by Andriy Portnov

Somewhat unexpectedly for me, my text about how a ‘Death Tower’ of a Nazi concentration camp for Soviet POWs was transformed into a five-star hotel in Lviv, published a week ago at the ‘History Lessons’ portal, in English translation on the 'Memory at War' collective blog, and in Ukrainian at Polit.ua, prompted a broad response. I received a great many letters and comments, and these have shaped the theme of this essay: the problem of reflecting on sites of forgetting.


11 February 2011

Ukraine's Monument War



Ukraine began 2011 with a war of monuments. The most significant blow of the ‘conflict’ thus far was struck on 31st December, when a monument to Stalin in Zaporizhzhia was blown up. The monument was erected by the local Communist party on the territory of its headquarters in 2010. The bust was reportedly decapitated on 28 December, before its complete destruction on New Year’s Eve. The authorities have reacted robustly to the incident, according to Dzerkalo Tyzhnia and other Ukrainian media, arresting members of nationalist organizations throughout Ukraine. The culprits are wanted on charges of terrorism.

27 October 2010

My Joy: a powerful cinematic exploration of post-Soviet traumatic memory

Traumatic memory is central to the latest film by Ukrainian director Sergei Loznitsa, My Joy (Schast'e moe). The film tells the darkly picaresque story of a flour deliveryman who, on a journey through rural Russia, encounters petty corruption, theft and violence. While clues such as the uniforms of the militia indicate that the film is set in Russia, it could take place almost anywhere in the rural, post-Soviet sphere. On his own website Loznitsa suggests that this is important to the film, saying ‘it is connected with the degradation and dying out of the space that speaks in the language of Platonov’s The Foundation Pit’. The local, rural dialects that form one aspect of Platonov’s language, and the culture they represent, are certainly strongly present in the film, although deeper affinities can also be found in its narrative ambiguity, journey structure and Dostoevsky-like examination of human baseness, cruelty and morality. What is most striking about the film, however, is its attitude to the past, or more specifically, how past traumas persist in the present.

07 September 2010

Summer of Memories # 1: Ukraine, a pruning or an overhaul?

The whiff of change – not necessarily to the good, for some democracy-watchers – has been in the air since Yanukovych’s election victory.

Various events have sparked discussion this Summer, from the visit by Security Forces to the rector of L’viv University (followed by his open letter to academics internationally), to the changing of the guard at the Institute for National Memory in Ukraine.

26 August 2010

Amended history textbooks for Ukraine's 11 year-olds



According to Ukrains'ka pravda, Ukraine's controversial education minister Dmytro Tabachnyk has begun to 'rewrite' history for the country's 11 year-old pupils. Comparing the 2005 and 2010 editions of the fifth-form textbook Introduction to the History of Ukraine, journalist Katerya Kapliuk has noted a number of amendments and excisions in the new editions pertaining to, inter alia, the 1932-33 Terror-Famine (Holodomor) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). A few of the most prominent deletions, according to Kapliuk:

A passage about the Battle of Kruty (1918), in which hundreds of students held off the entrance of thousands of Bolshevik troops into Kyiv;

A reference to Bolshevik violence against Ukrainian 'patriots';

A reference to Holodomor as man-made or 'artificial' [shtuchnyi];

A photo of UPA commander Roman Shukhevych, as well as an elaboration of UPA's 'two-front struggle' against Nazis and 'Soviet soldiers and partisans';

Passages about and photos of the 2004 Orange Revolution -- which, according to Ukrainian Ministry of Education official Oleksandr Udod, is too difficult for fifth-formers to understand. The full article can be read here.

Image above: Ukrains'ka pravda.

23 June 2010

Should Russia apologise for Holodomor?


'No,' says a (slim) majority of Russian respondents to a poll released yesterday by the Levada Centre. In response to the question 'In your view, should Russian leaders apologise to the Ukrainian people (Ukrainskomu narodu) for the "Holodomor" of the early 1930s, as they did recently to the Polish people for the tragedy of Katyn?', Russians replied:

7% Definitely yes

16% Probably yes

28% Probably no

24% Definitely no

25% Difficult to say

The poll can read another way: 48% of respondents were not opposed to the idea of an official apology to Ukrainians, with 23% either completely or somewhat supportive of one. As for Russian views of the reasons for the 'mass famine in Ukraine' in 1932-33, the responses were also remarkable:

27% hold that it was caused by 'unfavourable weather conditions';

35% hold that it was caused by 'mistakes made during the process of collectivization';

14% hold that it was caused by 'premeditated (prednamerennye) actions by Soviet authorities that sought to break the resistance of Ukrainian peasants who did not want to go to collective farms'; and

25% could not say.

The details of the Levada poll can be read here.

09 April 2010

Clash in Kyiv over 'Volyn Massacre' Exhibition



Yesterday in Kyiv a group of Ukrainians protested an exhibition at Ukrainian House organised by a 'human rights group' called 'Russophone Ukraine' (Русскоязычная Украина, a project of Party of Regions MP Vadim Kolesnichenko) and the Polish 'Society for Honouring the Memory of the Victims of the Crimes of Ukrainian Nationalists.' Video of the confrontation is embedded above. The exhibition is entitled 'The Volyn Massacre: Polish and Jewish Victims of OUN-UPA [Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army]'. An essay on the memory of the Volyn Massacre among the Ukrainian diaspora by John-Paul Himka can be read here. As with other events of this period, the historical scholarship on the massacre -- not to mention public discourse about it -- is often fraught and lacking in contextualization.

This volatile collision of Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian memories of wartime violence is the focus of our project, 'Memory at War: Cultural Dynamics in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine.'

11 March 2010

Battle over Bandera (Continued)


Alexander Motyl has published an even-handed assessment of the Bandera controversy in today's Moscow Times. An excerpt:

Bandera became especially popular as the noble ideals of the 2004 Orange Revolution were progressively tarnished by the heroes of that revolution, Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The more unpopular Yushchenko became, the more he promoted Bandera and the nationalists in the hope that some of their idealistic glow would rub off on him. Unfortunately, Yushchenko’s ill-considered conferral of Hero of Ukraine status on Bandera threw a wrench into a more or less even-tempered discussion of the nationalists and their legacy. Yushchenko’s critics — among them Putin and other top Russian officials who have indirectly rehabilitated Stalin — added fuel to the fire with their irresponsible accusations of fascism. At this point, a sensible discussion is almost impossible in the highly politicized atmosphere surrounding Bandera.

The objective, even-handed accounts of Ukrainian historians, who see Bandera in all his complexity, will eventually seep into the public realm, but only after Ukrainian identity is consolidated and Ukrainian fears of a neo-imperial Russia subside. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych could promote this shift by unifying the country around a common identity and history, vigorously protecting Ukrainian interests vis-a-vis Moscow and eschewing Yushchenko’s proclivity for provocation. Europe could help by opening its doors to Ukraine, and Russia can assist by rejecting Stalinism. And we should not forget about Western historians in this equation, who can do their part by refraining from simple-minded analyses.


The full article can be read here.

13 June 2009

Recent Sorties in the 'Memory War'



A quick update. On May 19, President Medvedev declared the creation of a special commission “to counteract attempts to falsify history that undermine the interests of Russia” (“по противодействию попыткам фальсификации истории в ущерб интересам России"). He did so days after recording this entry on his video-blog marking Victory Day, in which he states (after 3:06) that “attempts to falsify history” about World War II have become increasingly “angry and aggressive.” More about the ukase establishing the commission can be read in these Russian-language articles by RIA Novosti and Vedomosti and in this 11 June opinion piece by Janusz Bugajski from the Wall Street Journal Europe.

Who is responsible for these so-called “angry and aggressive” attempts to “falsify history,” according to the Kremlin? Medvedev has in mind, of course, Ukraine and Poland, who have recently announced a new development in their increasingly collaborative efforts to come to terms with the past.

On 11 June, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU, Служба безпеки України), which has become a significant actor in the investigation of Soviet crimes in Ukraine, announced that Poland's Institute of National Memory (IPN, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej) has given it a large store of archival documents relating to the activity of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA, Українська повстанська армія) from 1944-47. More about the transfer can be read in this Ukrainian-language article on Korrespondent.net. The SBU noted that this was not the first time it has collaborated with IPN, and these strides in Ukrainian-Polish cooperation on the memory front clearly have the Kremlin feeling defensive.

07 January 2009

A lecture by Hryhorii Kas'ianov on the political context of scholarship in Ukraine

First published on Polit.ru
Национализация истории в Украине
Лекция Георгия Касьянова

From Polit.ru: "Мы публикуем полную расшифровку лекции доктора исторических наук, заведующего отделом новейшей истории и политики Национальной Академии Наук Украины, профессора Киево-Могилянской академии Георгия Касьянова, прочитанной 13 ноября 2008 года в клубе — литературном кафе Bilingua в рамках проекта «Публичные лекции Полит.ру». Лекция продолжила тему исторической памяти и исторической политики."



Георгий Владимирович Касьянов родился в 1961 г. Закончил Киевский государственный педагогический институт (1983), аспирантуру Института истории Украины. Доктор исторических наук (1993). Стажировался в Гарварде и Кембридже, Лондонском и Хельсинкском университетах, Университете Монаша (Мельбурн, Австралия). Автор книг «Українська iнтелігенція 1920-30-х років: соціальний портрет та історична доля» (1992), «Українська інтелігенція на рубежі XIX-XX ст.: Соціально-політичний портрет» (1993), «Iсторiя України: нове бачення» (1996), «Незгодні: українська інтелігенція в русі опору 1960-80-х років» (1995), «Теорії нації та націоналізму (1999), «До питання по iдеологiю ОУН» (2003), «Украина 1991 - 2007. Очерки новейшей истории» (2008). Соавтор ряда коллективных трудов по истории Украины.

Текст лекции

Я последние несколько лет занимаюсь способами переписывания истории на постсоветском пространстве. Главное, о чем я хочу поговорить, – это процесс национализации или, как его еще называют, приватизации истории. Содержание этого процесса заключается в следующем. Ранее общая история отделяется в сепаратную и превращается в национальную историю, которая вступает в конфронтацию с общей историей. Этот процесс продолжается уже почти 20 лет в Украине. Сначала я дам ретроспективу, а потом поговорю о внутренних составляющих. О том, как это выглядит методологически, теоретически и какие встречаются наиболее экстремальные проявления этого процесса. Итак. Происходило это в Украине по, более или менее стандартному сценарию. Но сразу скажу, что национализация истории в Украине – это скорее возвращение к стандартным интерпретационным схемам конца XIX – начала XX вв. Считалось даже хорошим тоном у историков писать в предисловиях к своим работам, что «мы стоим на твердом фундаменте школы Грушевского». Очень важный момент в этом сепарировании своей истории от ранее общей, общесоветской, заключается в том, что это была схема реверсивной истории. Стандартная схема реверсивной истории предполагает проекцию настоящего положения дел в прошлое. Интересно, что это обозначилось и в самой логике обращения к историческому материалу. Пересмотр и переписывание своей истории начались, конечно же, со сталинизма, потом перешли к периоду украинской революции 1917-1921 гг., потом - к дореволюционному периоду, к казачеству и к Киевской Руси. Таким образом, была восстановлена (или заново построена) линейная история Украины в ее суверенном варианте. Важной составляющей процесса с 1980-х гг. было то, что он был очень четко увязан с политической конъюнктурой. Национал-демократическая интеллигенция была ферментом этого процесса. Она начала отделение, точнее, эмансипацию украинской истории. Ведь при СССР не было истории Украины. Была история УССР в качестве «краеведческого» курса.

В 1989-1990-х гг. история стала использоваться как политический аргумент. В 1990-м году был пик уничтожения памятников Ленину, демонстраций, связанных с историей, прежде всего, с советской. В 1990 праздновалась годовщина Запорожской Сечи, мероприятия сопровождались колоссальным антикоммунистическим подъемом. История была аргументом в дискредитации правящей партии и в обосновании претензий УССР на большую автономию и суверенитет. Активно используются исторические аргументы, чтобы показать обособленность Украины от общего пространства. Именно в этот момент начинают разрабатываться концепции, которые имели националистическое содержание и потом вполне комфортно вошли в курсы истории и официальную идеологию. На рубеже 90-х гг. произошла окончательная суверенизация истории. Через неделю после принятия Декларации о суверенитете УССР, в июле 90-го года, с благословения Политбюро ЦК КПУ была принята программа развития исторических знаний и изучения и пропаганды истории УССР. Это был очень интересный микс идей, стандартных форм, позаимствованных из диаспорной историографии, которую до этого называли «буржуазно-националистической», и так называемых марксистских форм. С этого момента история Украины становится самостоятельной и как предмет исследований, и как предмет изучения в школах.

Тут Украина стала независимым государством, и историки приступили к созданию «официальной версии истории». Процесс развивался по стандартной непритязательной логике. Здесь можно выделить следующие компоненты. Первое – возвращение к столпам народнической историографии конца XIX-го века. Второе – массовый наплыв диаспорной историографии на Украину. Третье – создание стандартной, официальной версии истории Украины, которая с тех пор существует в неизменном виде, по крайней мере на уровне школьных программ. Этот процесс, конечно, сопровождался некоторыми экстремальными проявлениями. Например, в 93-м году пытались ввести курс «научного национализма» в вузах. Предложили этот курс бывшие преподаватели научного коммунизма и истории КПСС. Происходило достаточно формальное замещение старых структур, институций и даже портретов новыми. Был такой курьезный случай. В одном из «головных» исторических учреждений делали ремонт, красили стены и осталось пятно от портрета Ленина. И сделали потрет Грушевского и повесили на это же место. История КПСС фактически трансформировалась в нормативный курс истории Украины. На первом году обучения в вузах это обязательный курс, с такими же функциями индоктринации и воспитания «гражданского самосознания». Читают его бывшие преподаватели истории КПСС или научного коммунизма. Можно сказать, что к началу 90-х гг. процесс национализации завершился. Стандартная схема (или исторический канон) существует и представляет собой набор не очень интересных интерпретационных и познавательных форм, о которых я бы хотел сейчас сказать.

Прежде всего, стоит обратить внимание на методологическую сущность национального канона. Он по определению должен быть телеологическим. Тут никаких особых проблем не было, поскольку в сознании историков существовала формационная телеология из того варианта марксизма, который практиковался в СССР. Телеология была бы нефункциональной без довольно радикального варианта эссенциализма, предполагающего наличие некоей трансцедентной идеи нации, которую историкам нужно лишь правильно «охватить», для чего требуются «правильные» понятия и категории.
Соответственно, в рамках этого канона, когда возникает вопрос об отсутствии государственности (или нации) в течение тысячелетий, задачей историка становится не объяснить то, почему нация или «ее» государство есть, ведь она существует постоянно, вне времени, а объяснить, почему ее иногда нет. И тогда в научный инструментарий вводятся такие понятия, как «национальное возрождение».
И это приводит нас к следующей очень важной черте национального исторического канона. В его риторике преобладают не научные формулы, а метафоры и идеологемы. «Национальное возрождение» - это классический пример инсталляции метафоры в научный язык. В 1990-е годы это произошло абсолютно безболезненно: и в преподавании, и в научных исследованиях идеологическая метафора, продукт «национального проекта» XIX века, замечательно прижилась как одно из центральных понятий, объясняющих «наличие отсутствия» нации и национальной государственности и компенсирующих моменты прерывности в заведомо непрерывной истории существования той самой нации. И теперь в школьных программах есть отдельная глава, посвященная «национальному возрождению», а в системе высшего исторического образования существует даже такой специальный курс.

Еще одна важная черта канона – это этноцентричность, культурная и этническая эксклюзивность. В такой стандартной схеме главным актором является своя нация. Все остальные либо отсутствуют, либо игнорируются. Иногда, когда необходимо присутствие другой нации, она служит либо фоном, либо антитезой своей нации, которая мешает своей нации реализовать свою сущность. В таком варианте история Украины – это история этнических украинцев. При всей комфортности такого подхода для проповедников упомянутого канона, все же постоянно возникает некое неудобство. Для внешнего наблюдателя всегда возникает проблема того, кто же такие «этнические украинцы». Ведь универсального критерия, подходящего под «украинский миллениум», не существует, — как найти этнических украинцев, к примеру, в Киевской Руси?

Еще одна важная черта – это линейность и абсолютизация непрерывности собственной нации. В более радикальном варианте предполагается, что украинская нация существовала всегда, по крайней мере, в рамках обозримой и описываемой истории. В более мягком – она существует с перерывами. Но эта прерывность перечеркивается тем, что автохтонный народ (украинцы) существовал всегда. А государство – не всегда. И, конечно, очень важная черта – это стремление удлинить свою историю. Наиболее радикальная форма, которая стала популярна в последнее время, – это обращение к Трипольской культуре. В некоторых вариантах, правда, не связанных с профессиональным историописанием, украинцы представлены как арии или даже как некие библейские народы.
Еще одна черта – это навязчивое стремление позиционировать себя в дихотомии «Восток-Запад». Хотя к Западу историки, исповедующие стандартный канон национализированной истории, относятся достаточно подозрительно, неотъемлемой чертой любого утверждения здесь является «европейскость» украинской нации. Тут возможны варианты. Например, «европейскость» подтверждается некоей извечной демократичностью украинской нации. Демократичность здесь – это, например, вечевой строй, казацкая христианская республика, первая в истории всего мира Конституция. Итак, размещение своей нации между Востоком и Западом с уклоном на Запад и с недоверием к нему является очень важной чертой канона национализированной историографии.
Как все это функционирует? Достаточно просто. Сама логика существования нового национального или «национализирующего» государства предполагает спрос на такую схему истории. Это существует в школьных и вузовских курсах. В рамках этой схемы работают вполне уважаемые историки, имеющие хороший статус.

Но в последние лет десять стандартная схема подвергается серьезным атакам, размыванию со стороны тех же украинских историков, часть которых не удовлетворяет интеллектуальная скромность этого канона. Они хотят чего-то большего. Поразительно, что прямых дискуссий не происходит. Разве что в 93-м году, когда был круглый стол во Львове о проблемах формирования украинской власти. Больше открытых дискуссий не было. Канонический дискурс функционирует в рамках официальной схемы истории, неканонический существует самостоятельно. И сам, кстати говоря, институционализируется в журналах, институтах и т. д.

Следующая тема - национальный нарратив и политика истории. Политика истории – понятие относительно новое для украинской историографии. В 90-е годы политики истории как таковой еще не было. Она возникла как бы сама собой. Была своя логика в этом процессе – историки сами, без каких-то указаний, поняли, что им делать. И делали. Это началось еще при Кучме. Но тогда это имело тогда чисто практический характер, поскольку Кучма интересовался историей для своих текущих интересов. С 2005-го года началось более активное использование истории в государственной политике и политике вообще. Конечно, предвестником был 2003-й год, когда возникли очень острые дискуссии с поляками по поводу Волынской резни. Тогда же начались интересные вещи. Институт стратегических исследований при президенте Украины издал брошюру, которая в год России и Украины выглядела очень комично. Там фактически на основе исторического материала говорилось, что Россия – это враг Украины, что Россия лишила Украину государственности в XVII веке. При этом на государственном уровне отмечалась годовщина Переяславской Рады.

В брошюре содержались настоящие терминологические перлы о том, что Богдан Хмельницкий построил парламентскую республику, ввел президентскую форму правления, бездефицитный бюджет и т. д. – заметим, что избыток анахронизмов также является отличительной чертой канона национализированной истории.

На 2003-й год приходится скандал по поводу учебников, когда вице-премьер российского правительства предложила взаимно пересмотреть учебники и убрать оттуда ксенофобские моменты. В Украине часть историков и общественных деятелей решили, что это попытка России переписать украинские учебники. У меня лично требовали подписать открытое письмо протеста. Я отказался, поскольку не знал сути предложений. Потом это все как-то успокоилось. Но 2005-й год знаменует собой активизацию политики истории со стороны власть имущих. Здесь Вторая мировая война, Голодомор. Сейчас видна инсталляция Голодомора практически как формы гражданской религии для части общества. Идет масштабный проект по созданию системы символов, памятных мест, общественных реакций и т.д. Идет как международная кампания, так и внутри Украины. Одна только Книга Памяти чего стоит! Это колоссальный проект! Конечно, надо упомянуть о создании института национальной памяти.

Последствия активизации политики памяти очевидны. Это некоторые проблемы с Польшей и Россией, где в свою очередь наблюдается серьезное обострение синдрома исторической памяти — как на уровне высшей власти, так и на уровне общества. Идет война историй и репрезентаций историй с обеих сторон. Причем, с обеих сторон война несправедливая. Историки попали в необычную ситуацию. Раньше можно было высказывать абсолютно любые точки зрения о любом историческом моменте. Сейчас в Украине вас тоже никто не будет преследовать за публичные высказывания, не совпадающие с официальной политикой истории. Но силовое поле вокруг этого есть. Когда моим коллегам и мне приходится высказывать соображения по поводу Голодомора и политики памяти, нас часто спрашивают: «А вы не боитесь?» Пока мы не боимся. Но осадок есть. Есть еще один важный тезис. Политика памяти в Украине не является системной. Она очень спонтанна. Она связана со вспышками текущих политических потребностей и с памятными датами. Вот пройдет 75-я годовщина голода 32-33-го гг. - и все значительно успокоится. Системной политики памяти пока нет, несмотря на создание института политики памяти. Собственно, все. Спасибо.

30 December 2008

Russia Profile writes about our recent workshop

The Memory Remains
by Anthony Johnston
Russia Profile
December 30, 2008

Historical Controversies in Russia and Eastern Europe Have Given Rise to a New Discipline: Memory Studies

Russia Profile’s most recent central theme examined how questions of historic memory affect not only how peoples see themselves, but their relations with other nations. Nowhere is this truer than in Eastern Europe, where differing memories of even very recent history can make or break a politician’s career and cause diplomatic crises between neighbors. The row between Russia and Estonia over the Bronze Soldier War memorial in Tallinn is just the most prominent of a number of such controversies. A recent conference of experts in Cambridge, UK, sought to examine this issue further.

Memory, in itself, is a thoroughly personal matter; it is a temporal record of our individual remembrance of the past. But memory, as cultivated and shared by a mass of individuals, is something more potent: it can transcend the passage of time and solidly provide the foundations of a nation's culture and identity. Memory, as a prevailing, instructive device in Russian and post-Soviet society, was at the center of scholarly debate at the two-day conference "Cultural Memory in Eastern Europe: Research Methods in East European memory studies" (December 18 & 19) held at King's College, University of Cambridge. The diversity of those attending - historians, literary critics, sociologists and anthropologists from Russia, Europe and the United States, as well as postgraduate students and journalists - very much corresponded to the multihued and at all times complex issue of the session - cultural memory.

As implied by its almost indescribable yet limitless components ('culture' + 'memory'), the term "cultural memory" is evidently connected with the idea of remembering something of cultural importance. Times of war, trauma and social upheaval, for example, are culturally significant; they force us out of our daily routines and compel us to use our newly-found physical, intellectual and moral endurance – for survival (the Holocaust being a standard example of such period). Alexander Etkind, the conference's organizer and a scholar at Cambridge University, sees how the chronology of events in 20th century Eastern Europe - for example, Russia's Great Terror, Poland's Katyn, and Ukraine's Holodomor - provide a necessary basis for discussion and examination of commemoration and collective trauma, and their role in collective identity, in the new field of "East European memory studies."  Etkind added that such examination comes alive through the "actual material which memory is made of – monuments, museums, books, legends, films, artifacts, textbooks, etc."

When using materials or objects for signifying memory, as you look at the grand stages in history, nothing is left bereft of political - and thus, perhaps, expedient - circumstances; a means of reshaping and recreating memory by political actors is at work here. The recent attempts of historical revisionism and reconciliation of Stalin and the Stalinist period - through positive accounts in school textbooks (Alexander Filippov’s New History of Russia: 1945-2006: Teachers’ Handbook) and television programs (the Name of Russia), point to the psychological notion of positive disavowal in the face of progress, as well as the image of a stable, patriarchal leader, as highlighted by Kevin Platt of the University of Pennsylvania and Jana Howlett of Cambridge respectively. This recognition of Stalin is supported by a "lack of distinction between victims and perpetrators, [resulting in a] self-inflicted trauma in the collective imaginary," as Platt described. Howlett has underlined the following: in contrast to the "Body Natural" of Stalin - one of inept, oratorical and intellectual skills - the "Body Politic" of Stalin - through the careful editorial work within Soviet mass media - is one of erudition and physical strength. These assessments point to the notion of cultural memory as ‘cultural propaganda’, an almost explicit attempt by state authorities to skim over a leader’s incongruities and dedicate themselves in amplifying a positive yet feigned interpretation – and thus, memory – of a leader within the public domain.

'Cultural propaganda' doesn't stop with Stalin. In the former Soviet satellite states, namely in Poland, Estonia and Ukraine, various ethnicities and political forces have competitively jousted for official ascendancy through the manifestation of monuments representing one cause or another, or their symbolic iconoclasm. Christoph Mick, a historian at Warwick University, described how different political regimes in post-WWII Poland promoted, through statues and monuments, different and often conflicting causes - and therefore, different memories. Mick also highlighted how, for example, the monument to Stepan Bandera, a celebrated nationalist leader of the interwar group Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), would be an affront to the Polish people, whose relatives died at the hands of the OUN at the massacre of thousands of Poles in the region of Volhynia (present-day Ukraine) during World War II. Maria Mälksoo, a researcher at the International Center for Defense Studies in Tallinn, views the controversy surrounding the Bronze Soldier statue, a Soviet World War II memorial in Tallinn's city center, as a moment when "[Estonia] and Russia seek more recognition from Europe of the Europeanness of their [respective] efforts in WWII, while, at the same time, denying the Europeanness of the other." Estonians see the monument as a symbol of Soviet occupation and repression and its removal as a gesture of liberation and espousal of European values, while ethnic Russians see it as a marker of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, their claim to reside in Estonia, and their contribution to the outcome of European history. The discrepancy over memory has also influenced the commemoration of the Holodomor, the 1932-1933 famine which struck Soviet Ukraine and other regions of the Soviet Union. Rory Finnin of Cambridge University argues that the excessive, retrospective perception, a building up of a particular vision of the Holodomor as genocide through diaries, memoirs and historical texts of the event (supported by the Ukrainian diaspora in North America) contrasts the nullifying or "making [the event] invisible," as well as reducing the free speech and scholarly, public discourse surrounding the event, thus putting pressure on reaching a true understanding on Holodomor.

These interpretations of cultural memory as 'propaganda' are indeed politically saturated, embedded in Soviet, Post-Soviet, or Russian state-led ideology – implying that society and its citizens and memories fall under the fulcrum of the "superstructure," as Cambridge historian Chris Ward has attested at the conference. Nevertheless, to what extent does all cultural memory fall under the political gaze?

Looking at the processes of how memory is created and transmitted puts into question the idea of cultural memory as a universal and permanent vehicle of ideology. Harald Wydra, a social scientist at Cambridge, reflected upon the notion of how generations, and their different time periods of "social initiation" (the developmental stage in an individual's life (from age 13 to 25) when he becomes aware of the general political trend characteristic of that time period), each have their own memory of the age; in Wydra's words, "your generation is defined when you enter or are initiated into your political consciousness." And so, your generation is "the inter-individual nature of memories," not necessarily bound by tendencies from other generations. Nevertheless, conventions, particularly ones from family members, and with it, the impossibility of forgetting a traumatic event, are transferred from generation to generation. In this way, a cultural memory can be maintained outside of state surveillance, and into the realm of the private domain. In the case of Poland following World War Two, one interpretation and meaning of the war sympathetic to the Polish nationalist forces (Armia Krajowa) was carried on generationally, in contrast to the meaning of the war received from the Communist government; in other words, you can recreate and reshape a new memory, but the old memory will still be remembered.

Naturally, many cultural artifacts evoke a humanistic sense of nostalgia and pathos, rather than anything intrinsically political. Jukka Gronow, a sociologist from Uppsala University, notes that the prevalence of memory on a sensory level, in the form of nostalgia for consumer products, has not diminished in many areas since the Soviet period, with the popularity of, for example, Soviet cultural icons as Sovetskoye Shampanskoye and singer Alla Pugacheva an established part of Russian cultural life today. Feelings of nostalgia and pathos emerge from Cambridge anthropologist Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov's examination of how members of the public reacted to the 2006 exhibition "Gifts to the Leaders", an exhibition at the Kremlin Museum in Moscow showcasing over 500 gifts specially crafted and given to the Soviet heads of state. Ssorin-Chaikov, who developed the show along with museum curators, collected the guestbook, and reading through the comments left by the exhibit's visitors discovered that the show's artifacts evoked a strong sense of remembrance, a return to childhood, nostalgia and sentiment in the Soviet past, but not one consisting of a sense of deference to leadership. One comment read as follows: "The exhibition aroused nostalgic memories [...]; this has nothing to do with leaders." In a wholly poignant documentary, filmmaker Katya Krausova reinforces that heartrending and humanistic power of empathy and compassion in the ability to remember, as she films photographer Yuri Dojc journeying and meeting Slovak Jews who survived the Holocaust. In seeing Dojc's photographs of these survivors, the viewers are compelled to recall and remember that these people achieved survival through the utmost trauma.

Sometimes, difficult truths can only be uttered through fiction, while the most ineffable ones require the most fictive fiction. Dina Khapaeva, a historian and sociologist from St. Petersburg, described how in contemporary post-Soviet fiction, authors, such as writer Sergei Lukyanenko of the cult fantasy novel and movie Night Watch, wish to encapsulate "the transformation of attitudes, values, customs and social relations" in the post-Soviet space using the most fantastical genre - horror and science-fiction.

With all these discussions, whether it is interpreted as a tool of state authority, or a genuine, heart-felt, personal sentiment, the notion of cultural memory is governed by an apprehension that the heritage of the past can disappear or be forgotten. But its fading can be diminished through appropriate discourse and reconciliation.

27 December 2008

Scared straight? L'viv uses a dark memory to fight 'zaitsiv'

Over a year ago, the municipal administration of Donets'k used an image of Stalin on city billboards to frighten citizens into paying their utility bills. The ad campaign was shortlived.

Now L'viv is mobilizing history to scare citizens straight.  On flyers produced and distributed by the city's transport authority (seen at left), 'zaitsi' or fare-evaders on busses and trams are being likened to Bohdan Stashyns'kyi, who assassinated the Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera (of the Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv, OUN) in 1959.  Stashyns'kyi was coerced by the KGB into killing Bandera after being arrested for riding on a bus without a ticket.  The flyers from L'vivelektrotrans read: 'Ne bud' skhozhym na byvtsiu Stepana Bandery!...  Velykyi zlochyn pochynaiet'sia z dribnoho pravoporushennia!' (Don't be like the murderer of Stepan Bandera!  A great crime begins with a small crime!')

Read more here (English) and here (Ukrainian).  Listen to the head of L'vivelektrotrans explain the flyer campaign here.